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Introduction
Since the 1978 reform, while maintaining a rigid official exchangerate pegged to the US dollar (USD) under capital control, China hasallowed the operation of a restricted market-determined swap rate
in a bid to promote the country’s trade and foreign direct investment. In
1994 the dual exchange rates were merged, and a national foreign ex-
change market was subsequently established in Shanghai. Since 1996, the
Chinese currency, Renminbi Yuan (RMB), has been fully convertible on the
current account on the mainland, and until 2004 China allowed very lim-
ited convertibility of RMB outside the Mainland, namely in Hong Kong.
Starting in July 2009, prompted by the global financial crisis of the previ-
ous year, China allowed the use of RMB in the settlement of its cross-bor-
der trade. Since then, the pace of RMB internationalisation has quickened,
with Hong Kong gradually emerging as an RMB offshore market. This
paper aims to assess the factors motivating RMB internationalisation, and
the unique role Hong Kong has played in the process, against the back-
ground of China’s evolving foreign exchange (FX) markets and the RMB
exchange rate benchmarking to the Hong Kong markets. The paper is or-
ganised as follows: The first section reviews the institutional arrange-
ments of the evolving FX markets on the mainland. In the second section,
the determination of the RMB exchange rate is analysed, using the flows
of funds approach. The factors motivating RMB internationalisation will
be assessed in the third section, and the unique role of Hong Kong in the
process is examined in the fourth section. The prospects for RMB interna-
tionalisation are evaluated in the fifth section, while the sixth section
concludes the paper.
Structure of the evolving Chinese FX
markets
In line with the open-door policy underpinning the 1978 reforms, China
has started to implement gradual reform of its rigid foreign exchange system
pegged to the USD. From March 1979, the newly established State Admin-
istration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), a specialized bureau under the People’s
Bank of China (PBOC), (1) has been assigned the role of regulator in the Chi-
nese FX markets. During the period 1979 to 1994, SAFE allowed domestic
and foreign enterprises in China to balance their needs for FX among them-
selves in designated FX Swapping Centres, using market-determined swap
rates, along with the official exchange rates for the RMB.
In January 1994, the official and swap rates were unified at
USD 1 = RMB 8.7, reflecting China’s acceptance of Article VIII of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund that multiple and discriminatory exchange rates
should not exist in the country. (2) Three months later, a national foreign ex-
change market, the China Foreign Exchange Trading System (CFETS), was es-
tablished in Shanghai. Financial institutions have to be assessed and ap-
proved by the PBOC before they are admitted as members of the market. In
December 1996, the RMB was made fully convertible on the current account
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paper.
1. PBOC was formally appointed as the central bank by the State Council in September 1983. At present,
Mr. Gang Yi, who is the Director of SAFE, is also one of the deputy governors of the PBOC.
2. In December 1993, the official rate and swap rate were 5.7 and 8.7, respectively. The unified rate fol-
lowed the swap rate, as more than 80 percent of the FX transactions used the swap rate.
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of the balance of payments. Capital account restrictions are still imposed on
direct investments and financial investments within and outside China. (3)
Since the country’s accession to the World Trade Organisation as a devel-
oping country in December 2001, the bank-dominated Chinese financial
sector has made significant improvements in its money markets and mon-
etary policy operations. (4) These provided China with the foundation upon
which the country could switch from a USD peg system to a managed
float system in July 2005, allowing increased flexibility for changes in the
RMB exchange rate with reference to a basket of currencies. (5) Since then,
the Chinese FX markets have seen a steady increase of member institu-
tions and the introduction of new products. 
Table 1 shows the structure of FX products and their member institutions
in CFETS.
FX Spot
FX spot trading refers to buying one currency with another for immedi-
ate delivery. Seven major foreign currencies (FC) are now traded spot
against RMB (CNY) in Shanghai. (6) They are: US dollar (USD), Japanese Yen
(JPY), HK dollar (HKD), Euro (EUR), Great Britain Pound Sterling (GBP),
Malaysian Ringgit (MYR), and Russian Rouble (RUB). With the dominant
role of the USD in international trade and investment, the currency pair
USD/CNY has accounted for more than 90 percent of the total spot trad-
ing in China.
Following the break-up of the Bank of China’s monopoly position in FX
trading from 1994, more financial institutions have been approved by
PBOC to trade FC against CNY on the CFETS platform. Table 2 shows that
the membership for spot trading has been dominated by domestic and for-
eign banks in cities.
Enterprises and individuals in China must sell and buy FX through desig-
nated banks. Hence, the big five state-owned banks (the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC),
the Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), and the Bank
of Communication (BCOM)), with their extensive operations and branch
networks across the country, have accounted for the bulk of spot trading. (7)
The tight control over the FX market is also reflected in the fact that no
insurance companies, securities companies, or fund management compa-
nies are members of CEFTS.
FX Forward
With forward trading, the currencies will be delivered at a future date at
the pre-agreed exchange rate. FX forward therefore helps international
traders manage FX risks. In April 1997, BOC first launched FX forward prod-
ucts to its clients. Three of the other big banks (CCB, ICBC, and ABC) fol-
lowed its example in 2003. FX risks became more significant when the
RMB exchange rate was determined with reference to a basket of curren-
cies from July 2005. Subsequently, CFETS started the forward market for its
members in August 2005. At present, there are fewer members for forward
than spot trading. Excluding MYR and RUB, five international currencies
can be traded forward against CNY. Meanwhile, as foreign firms and in-
vestors outside China could not gain access to its FX Forward market, USD-
settled contracts, RMB Non-Deliverable Forward have been offered by in-
ternational banks in the offshore markets of Singapore and Hong Kong
from 1996. (8)
FX swap and currency swap
An FX swap is a purchase of one currency against another now (spot),
and an agreement to reverse that transaction at a future date (forward),
and in a currency swap, while maintaining a FX swap, interest payments
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3. For a more detailed analysis of the FX market in China from 1978 to September 2005, see Jikang Zhang
and Yuanyuan Liang, “The Institutional and Structural Problems of China’s Foreign Exchange Market
and Implications for the New Exchange Rate Regime,” China: An International Journal, vol. 4, no. 1,
2006, pp. 60-85.
4. See Man Kwong Leung and Qianjin Lu, “Changing Money Market and Monetary Policy Operations in
China: An Institutional Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 20, no. 69, 2011, pp. 287-305.
5. The constituent currencies and their weights in the basket have not been disclosed. However, the USD
is expected to have the largest weight, as the USA was China’s largest trading partner between 2005
and 2010.
6. ISO 3-letter codes are adopted for the currencies in international FX markets. CNY is the code for the
RMB traded onshore on the mainland. For the currency pair USD/CNY = 6.50, USD is the base and
CNY is the counter such that USD 1= RMB 6.5.
7. Zhang and Liang, op.cit..
8. See Hung-Gay Fung, Wai K. Leung, and Jiang Zhu, “Nondeliverable Forward Market for Chinese RMB: A
First Look,” China Economic Review, vo1. 15, 2004, pp. p. 348-352.
Special feature
Table 2 – Types of member institutions for spot
trades with CNY (March 2011)
Type Number
Chinese policy, nationwide, 
and city commercial banks
99
Foreign banks and their branches 100
Rural financial institutions 72
Finance companies 23
Non-financial companies 1
Total number 295
Source: Chinamoney website.
Table 1 – CFETS: FX products and members (31 March 2011)
Spot Forward FX Swap Currency Swap
Exchanges between 
foreign currencies (spot)
Currency pairs* 7 5 5 5 9
Members 295 75 71 24 84
*one of which is RMB, except in exchanges between foreign currencies (spot).
Source: Chinamoney website.
Exchanges with RMB
from the holding of the two currencies are also swapped. CFETS started the
FX swap and currency swap for its members in April 2006 and August
2007, respectively. The two products have provided two more risk manage-
ment tools in the Chinese FX markets. As in the forward market, only five
currencies are traded using FX and currency swap.
Foreign currency pairs
CFETS has allowed spot trading of foreign currency pairs since May 2005.
At present, nine foreign currency pairs are traded. They are: AUD/USD,
EUR/JPY, EUR/USD, GBP/USD, USD/CAD, USD/CHF, USD/HKD, USD/JPY,
and USD/SGD. (9)
From the outset, trading in CFETS has been conducted using the cen-
tralised auto-matching system, with order priority based on price and
time. From January 2006, a market-making system has been introduced.
With market makers providing bid and offer quotes, a bilateral trade be-
tween two members can be concluded. Figure 1 shows that from 1995 to
2010, the turnover values of the Chinese FX market have been very small
when compared with the Hong Kong market. The Chinese market started
from a very low base, with a daily average turnover of USD 0.2 billion in
1998 to USD 19.8 billion in 2010, whereas the corresponding figures for
the Hong Kong market were USD 79.9 billion and USD 237.6 billion. In
fact, Hong Kong has been among the world’s top six largest FX markets in
turnover value over the past two decades. (10)
In respect of the structure of FX products in the two markets in 2010,
Table 3 shows that the sum of “outright forward” and “FX and currency
swap” was more than 90 percent of the turnover value in Hong Kong
whereas the corresponding figure for the Mainland market was about 32
percent. Given more than 90 percent of the spot trading were concen-
trated on the currency pair of USD/CNY, this reflects the fact that by aim-
ing for steady development via control over market entry and the set of
products offered, the competitiveness, product range and risk management
of the Mainland markets have had to be compromised.
Determination of the onshore RMB exchange
rate
Given the importance of the USD under the managed float from July
2005, the central parity exchange rate for USD/CNY will first be deter-
mined, based on the rates quoted by the 26 banks as market-makers.
CFETS has not, however, disclosed the number of top and bottom rates to
be trimmed, or the weightings attached to the remaining banks in arriving
at the central rate. Given the USD/CNY rate, the central parity rates for
HKD/CNY, GBP/CNY, JPY/CNY, and EUR/CNY are then derived from the
cross rates of USD/CNY with the prevailing market rates of USD/HKD,
GBP/USD, USD/JPY, and EUR/USD in the international FX markets. (11) All
the central parity rates are announced at 9.15 a.m. on each trading day.
At present, a trading band is imposed on each central parity rate.
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9. AUD and CAD stand for Australian dollar and Canadian dollar, respectively.
10. No published figures are available after the revaluation of the RMB in July 2005, and the figures for
2007 and 2010 are derived from those in the BIS Triennial Survey on the global foreign exchange mar-
kets.
11. Given their small trading volumes, the central parity rates for CNY/MYR and CNY/RUB are the undis-
closed weighted average rates quoted by the three and four banks, respectively, as the market makers
for the two currencies.
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Figure 1 – The Average Daily Turnover in the Chinese and Hong Kong Foreign Exchange market
(USD billion) from 1995 to 2010
Source: Bank for International Settlements.
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Whereas USD/CNY is subject to a daily movement capped at ± 0.5 per-
cent from its central rate, the trading bands for HKD, JPY, EUR, and GBP are
± 3 percent, and for MYR and RUB they are ± 5 percent. (12) During the
trading day, commercial banks in China are allowed margins of 1 percent
and 4 percent, respectively, from the parity rates in their FX and FC notes
exchange dealings with their customers.
Sources of supply and demand for USD
Foreign exchange has been increasingly received as another asset class in
the global FX markets. (13) As a financial asset, the pricing of FX will be af-
fected by relative interest rates and the expected movements of the ex-
change rate. In developed markets, FX transactions are further dominated
by the portfolio investments denominated in different currencies.
Given the foreign exchange controls in China, the asset market approach
to its exchange rate determination is not a valid tool. Instead, the CNY ex-
change rate can be analysed with the flow of funds underlying the sources
of supply and demand of FC against CNY in the Chinese FX market. When
the exchange rate for USD/CNY increases, Chinese goods, as well as direct
and financial investments in China, will become cheaper for foreign in-
vestors. More USD will then be supplied to China. The supply (S0) curve for
USD against the exchange rate of USD/CNY is composed of:
a. USD earnings of exporting firms in China;
b. Foreign direct investment in China (FDI);
c. Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII). (14)
Similarly, when the exchange rate (USD/CNY) decreases, foreign goods
and direct and financial investments abroad will become expensive for
Chinese investors, decreasing the demand for USD in China. The demand
(D0) curve for USD is made up of:
a. USD requirements of importing firms in China;
b. Outward direct investments of Chinese firms (ODI);
c. Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII). (15)
Assuming that all transactions are settled in USD, Table 4 shows that due
to capital control, FDI plus QFII, together with ODI and QDII, have ac-
counted for very limited shares of the sources of supply and demand for
USD in the Shanghai FX market. It can be seen that, even though QFII were
marginally smaller than QDII, there were net inflows of USD funds arising
from the consistent trade surplus, and an excess of FDI over ODI during the
period 2005 to 2010.
Moreover, given a stable exchange rate, the net inflow of USD will be
taken up by SAFE, leading to an increase in the FX reserve. Table 4 shows,
however, that the increase in FX reserves has been higher than the inflows
of funds from these authorised sources. This may provide an indication of
the quantity of “hot” money, or unauthorised short-term capital into
China, triggered by the expected appreciation in recent years and in pur-
suit of speculative gains by way of artificially high salaries and export earn-
ings of Chinese firms, and falsified foreign direct investments in China. 
Figure 2 shows how the exchange rate can be determined with the total
sources of supply and demand for USD, and government policy actions.
The central parity rate for USD/CNY is illustrated by the intersection of the
D0 and S0 at K, which is subject to the daily cap and trading band of ± 0.5
percent. The greater supply over demand of USD funds is represented by a
net rightward shift of the supply curve to S1. The resulting downward
movement of USD/CNY, or the depreciation of USD against CNY, is now
assumed to go to L, beyond the trading band. SAFE will intervene and pur-
chase USD so that the demand will increase to DA and the exchange rate
will be pushed back to the lowest daily limit allowed at M. 
Meanwhile, inflow of hot money can also be represented by a rightward
shift of the supply curve. SAFE has responded with heavy penalties and
more frequent checks on capital flows, and these added costs will shift the
supply curve back to the left and offset the impact of hot money on the
exchange rate. In addition to the fixing of central parity rates and trading
bands, the Chinese government would also be able to influence the ex-
change rate on a long-term basis with liberalisation policies on trade, di-
rect investment, and financial investment at home and abroad. For exam-
ple, with more liberalisation policies on import and outward investment
abroad, and by enlarging the quota for QDII, a rightward shift of the de-
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12. RUB/CNY is also traded in MICEX, the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange from December 2010.
13. Bank for International Settlements (2010) reported that there was a considerable increase in FX spot
trading due to the more active participation of other financial institutions such as insurance compa-
nies, hedge funds, and retail investors.
14. Authorised by SAFE from December 2002, QFII permits foreign financial institutions abroad to pur-
chase RMB with a given quota in USD so that they can invest in the financial products listed on the
stock exchanges in China. In September 2010, 93 financial institutions subscribed a total quota of USD
19 billion.
15. Started in May 2006, SAFE allowed domestic and foreign financial institutions in China quotas to pur-
chase USD with RMB so that they can invest in financial markets abroad. In September 2010, 87 fi-
nancial institutions took up an investments quota amounting to USD 67 billion.
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Table 3 – Structure of the FX markets in China and Hong Kong in 2010 
(USD billion)
Percent
(%)
(USD billion)
Percent
(%)
Spot 13.4* 67.7 43.8 18.4
Outright forward 0.5 2.5 32 13.5
FX and currency swap 5.9 29.8 184 77.4
OTC options 0 0 7.7 3.2
TOTAL 19.8 100 237.6 100
*Derived from the sources in Table 1 and 2. Turnover value of USD 0.2 billion for foreign currency pairs inclusive.
Source: Bank for International Settlements, SAFE Annual Report.
mand curve would increase the rate for USD/CNY, or the pressure on ap-
preciation of CNY would be reduced.
Exchange rate movements
Between January 1994 and July 2005, the RMB exchange rate was kept
stable at around USD/CNY = 8.28. In July 2005, there was a one-off reval-
uation of the RMB to USD/CNY=8.11. (16) Figure 3 shows the movements
of the USD/CNY exchange rate and the Real Effective Change Rate (REER)
Index between July 2005 and April 2011. (17) As the USD has carried the
largest trade weight, the Chinese government has tried to achieve ex-
change rate stability by way of managing the USD/CNY rate. CNY was first
allowed to respond to market forces and appreciated 17 percent nominally
against USD from 8.11 in August 2005 to 6.93 in July 2008. The REER Index
showed a trend loss of external competitiveness by 8.7 percent from 101.4
to 110.2 over the same period.
When the impact of the global financial crisis on the Chinese economy
started to be felt in July 2008, China reverted to pegging its currency to
the USD and maintained a stable exchange rate, with USD/CNY moving
narrowly around 6.83 for the next two years. With the depreciation of cur-
rencies of Chinese trading partners, the REER Index rose steadily to 126 in
February 2009 and dropped to 118 in July 2010 following the depreciation
of the USD to which the RMB was linked. When the global economy be-
came stabilised in July 2010, China reactivated its currency link to a basket
of currencies and allowed its exchange rate to respond to market forces. As
a result, USD depreciated by more than 3.2 percent, from 6.79 in August
2010 to 6.57 in April 2011. (18)
Factors motivating RMB internationalisation
When compared to the Hong Kong markets, the development of the Chi-
nese FX markets and the process of RMB exchange rate determination
have been heavily influenced by government policies on capital control.
The country’s ultimate goal of the full convertibility of the capital account
has provided the underlying motivation for RMB internationalisation, or
16. The one-off revaluation of RMB on 21 July 2005 was not in response to international pressure, but
rather aimed to dampen the surge of hot money and to signal the official start of the move to flexi-
bility. See Michael Goujon and Samuel Guerineau, “The Modification of the Chinese Exchange Rate Pol-
icy,” China Perspectives, no. 64, 2006, pp. 34-44.
17. The RMB Real Effective Exchange Rate Index is defined as a trade-weighted average of bilateral ex-
change rates of China’s trading partners, adjusted by their respective price deflators. A rise in the RMB
REER Index would mean the currency is appreciating on a real, trade-weighted basis, suggesting a loss
in external price competitiveness.
18. It will also be in the interests of China to allow for appreciation of RMB, albeit slowly, as this can help
reduce imported inflation from raw commodities, and reduce inflationary pressure from reduced sup-
ply of RMB bank reserves with the purchase of USD by the PBOC.
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Table 4 – Sources of supply and demand for USD in the FX market
Supply of USD 
(USD billion)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Exports 762 969 1218 1431 1202 1578
FDI 60.3 63 74.8 92.4 90 105.7
QFII Quotas 2.2 3.3 1 2.8 3.2 2.5
Total (S) 824.5 1035.3 1293.8 1526.2 1295.2 1686.2
Demand for USD 
(USD billion)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Imports 660 791 956 1133 1006 1395
ODI 12.3 17.6 26.5 55.9 56.5 50.2
QDII Quotas - 9.7 30 3.3 8 7
Total (D) 672.3 818.3 1012.5 1192.2 1070.5 1452.2
(S) - (D) 152.2 217 281.3 334 224.7 234
FX reserves 119 247.4 461.9 417.8 453.1 448.3
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks. State Administration of Foreign Exchange.
Figure 2 – The FX market for RMB in Shanghai
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the wider use of the Chinese currency by individuals and firms domiciled
outside the Chinese mainland, which is expected to contribute to capital
account liberalisations and exchange rate flexibility in offshore and on-
shore markets. RMB internationalisation entails three different phases in
which the role of RMB will evolve as a trade settlement currency, an in-
vestment currency, and a reserve currency. (19) With the restricted access to
the Chinese financial markets, RMB has been at the preliminary stage of
this process, which kick-started in the late 1990s. (20) The 2008 global fi-
nancial crisis acted as a catalyst in accelerating the pace of the RMB inter-
nationalisation strategy undertaken by China. 
The Chinese authorities have stated publicly that both capital account
convertibility and exchange rate flexibility are their medium-term goals.
When these goals are achieved, China, already the second largest single
economy in terms of national incomes, can gain independence in its op-
eration of monetary policy and better absorb external shocks. (21) During
this transitional period, the Chinese authorities have recognised that
premature opening of the capital account poses risks if regulations and
supervision arrangements in the financial sector are inadequate. (22) De-
spite financial reforms, especially those after China’s entry to the WTO,
the Chinese financial sector has not yet been ready for capital account
convertibility, given its state-controlled banking sector, tightly regulated
corporate bond market, and highly speculative stock market. (23) Rather,
the policy response has been to adopt the “crossing the river by feeling
for stones” approach, (24) namely by gradually allowing greater exchange
rate flexibility, along with cautiously easing controls on its capital ac-
count. The strategy of RMB internationalisation via Hong Kong is a re-
flection of this policy stance. The advantages of this strategy are to pro-
vide time for Chinese industries to adapt to gradual changes in ex-
change rate, and for the Chinese authorities to improve the regulatory
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19. To internationalise a currency to the fullest extent is to make the currency a widely adopted currency
by private sectors to settle trade deals and make financial investment denominated in the currency,
and by national governments to hold their official reserves and to anchor their currencies. USD is a
case in point and is the most internationalised currency. See Haihong Gao and Yongding Yu, “Interna-
tionalization of the RMB,” BOK-BIS Seminar in Seoul, 19-20 March 2009.
20. Since the late 1980s, China opened up trade with neighbouring countries such as Vietnam, Myanmar,
Mongolia, and Russia. The RMB has gradually become one of the major currencies for these border
trades. Since the 1997 financial crisis, the exchange rate stability exhibited by the RMB and the strong
Chinese economy have prompted the expanded use of the currency in these border trades. This RMB
regionalisation was the beginning process of RMB internationalisation. See Jing Li, “Regionalization of
the RMB and China’s Capital Account Liberalization,” China & World Economy, vol. 12, no. 2, 2004,
pp. 86-100.
21. This is a deduction from the Mundell-Fleming model of the Impossible Trinity. At present, under FX
control, China can set its own interest rates in its monetary policy and maintain a stable exchange rate.
When RMB becomes fully convertible on the capital account, China has to adopt a flexible exchange
rate regime if the country intends to maintain an independent monetary policy. See Eswar Prasad,
Thomas Rumbaugh, and Qing Wang, “Putting the Cart before the Horse? Capital Account Liberalization
and Exchange Rate Flexibility in China,” IMF Policy Discussion Paper no. 05/01, January 2005.
22. On this topic, see Eswar Prasad and Kose M. Ayhan, “Liberalizing Capital,” Finance and Development,
2004, pp. 50-51.
23. For a more detailed discussion, see Nicholas Lardy and Patrick Douglass, “Capital Account Liberalization
and the Role of the Renminbi” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper Series,
no. 11-6, 2011.
24. This phrase of Deng Xiaoping describes the gradualist approach that has exemplified reform in Post-
Mao China.
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Figure 3 – Movements of USD/CNY and REER Index from July 2005 to April 2011
Sources: State Administration of Foreign Exchange and Bank for International Settlements.
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and supervisory framework and corporate governance of its financial
sector. (25)
The 2008 global financial crisis initiated in the USA has made RMB inter-
nationalisation a topical issue worldwide. (26) To revive the US economy at
near zero short-term interest rates, the Federal Reserve has resorted to
purchasing a large volume of long-term Treasury debt in a bid to lower the
long-term interest rates, in a monetary policy strategy known as quantita-
tive easing. The policy has resulted in a marked increase in USD liquidity
at home and around the globe, increasing the currency’s volatility and
downside risks. As a result, most countries, especially emerging markets,
have found it less attractive to hold USD as an investment and as a reserve
currency. China, which holds the largest reserves of USD, has been hit par-
ticularly hard. (27) Moreover, China also has to address the growing political
pressure on a faster appreciation of the RMB from the USA and EU, which
have attributed their slower growth and higher unemployment to their
trade deficits with China. All these developments have prompted China to
take action to reduce its reliance on USD assets in its reserves and the USD
influence on its exchange rate flexibility. The RMB internationalisation
strategy that formally started in Hong Kong in February 2004, but has
grown rather slowly since then, has to be undertaken at a faster pace. (28)
It is expected that the internationalisation of the RMB would reduce the
vulnerability of RMB against USD in the long term, and China would be
able to diversify its reserves through the purchase of natural resources
from emerging markets, which are increasingly willing to accept RMB. (29)
More specifically, China will be able to have greater influence in the region,
as ASEAN countries have started to accept RMB assets for their trade sur-
plus with China. The RMB internationalisation is also likely to further en-
hance China’s political influence in the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank after decisions were made to increase the country’s voting
rights in these two supranational institutions. (30)
Prompted by the underlying and more immediate motivating factors for
RMB internationalisation, in July 2009, China allowed its cross-border trade to
be settled in RMB in a pilot scheme between four cities in Guangdong
Province and Shanghai on the mainland; and Hong Kong, Macau, and South
East Asian countries abroad. From 23 June 2010, the scheme was extended to
operate between a total of 18 provinces in China and the rest of the world. A
breakthrough in the internationalisation process of the RMB was made when
PBOC and BOCHK (Bank of China, Hong Kong), the RMB Clearing Bank,
signed an agreement in July 2010 allowing banks in Hong Kong to clear and
settle RMB transactions through BOCHK. All Hong Kong firms would also be
able to transfer funds between RMB accounts held in different Hong Kong
banks without any restrictions. This has effectively allowed other financial in-
stitutions such as insurance companies and fund management companies to
come up with new RMB insurance policies and fund products for sale to cus-
tomers in Hong Kong and abroad. Overseas banks and customers can also
have access to this newly-established RMB interbank market if they open set-
tlement accounts with an RMB participating bank in Hong Kong. 
With these liberalisations, the average monthly amount of RMB settle-
ments rose quickly from RMB 4 billion in the first half of 2010 to RMB 57
billion in the second half. In 2010, over 75 percent of the cross-border
trade in RMB went through Hong Kong. The rise in RMB deposits in Hong
Kong has been attributable to the net inflows of RMB from more exports
than imports from the mainland settled in RMB. (31) Table 5 shows that
both RMB deposits and participating banks in Hong Kong have increased
significantly from 2009 to 2011.
The unique role of Hong Kong
It has often been taken for granted, and it is indeed the case, judging
from the rapid growth of the RMB business in Hong Kong (Table 5), that
Hong Kong, being part of China and having its own developed financial
sector, will emerge as the natural choice for the Chinese authorities to
push forward RMB internationalisation. However, given the strategic im-
portance of RMB internationalisation for the Chinese mainland and
Hong Kong economies, the question of why the Chinese authorities
have chosen to use Hong Kong as a substitute for actual liberalisation
of capital flows onshore in the form of the US international banking fa-
cilities, or instead of Singapore as an offshore banking centre, warrants
in-depth analysis from political, economic, and risk management per-
spectives.
Hong Kong returned to Chinese sovereignty from British administration
in July 1997 under the innovative concept of “one country, two sys-
tems.” (32) The continuing development of Hong Kong as an international
financial sector clearly depends on the political blessings of the Chinese
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25. Along with a more stable and robust financial system, greater exchange rate flexibility is regarded as
a prerequisite for undertaking a substantial liberalisation of the capital account in China. See Eswar
Prasad, Thomas Rumbaugh, and Qing Wang, op. cit. The limits of this strategy are that China needs to
withstand political pressure from other countries for faster liberalisation in its exchange rate and cap-
ital account, and to regulate the unauthorised flows of short-term funds across its borders by admin-
istrative means.
26. Fearing an economic slowdown after the 2008 global financial crisis, the Chinese government under-
took a large fiscal stimulus worth RMB 4 trillion, and adopted expansionary monetary policies. As a re-
sult, China managed to sustain high real growth rates of 9.2 percent in 2009, and 10.3 percent in 2010.
The massive increase in RMB liquidity has been perceived as the underlying reason for high inflation
in 2011, which is another topic for future research. On the limitations of the monetary policy in China,
see Anne-Laure Baldi-Delatte, “A 1 Trillion dollar Question: Is the Current Exchange Rate Regime Sus-
tainable?” China Perspectives, 2006, vol. 67, pp. 11-20.
27. For this topic, see Shalendra D. Sharma (2010), “China as the World’s Creditor and the United States
as the World’s Debtor: Implications for Sino-American Relations,” China Perspectives, no. 4, pp. 100-
115.
28. From February 2004, banks in Hong Kong have been allowed to provide RMB business in deposits, 
remittances, currency exchange, and credit cards on a personal basis. 
29. Melissa Murphy and Wen Jin Yuan, “Is China ready to challenge the dollar? Internationalization of the
RMB and its Implications for the United States,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies, October
2009.
30. China’s voting rights in the IMF and World Bank were increased from just 4 percent and 2.27 percent
to 6.4 and 4.42, respectively, in 2010. Sources: the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
31. Peter Pang, “Hong Kong’s Expanding Role as an Offshore RMB centre,” Hong Kong Monetary Authority,
22 February 2011.
32. Article 109 of Chapter 5 of the Basic Law, the constitution of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKSAR), reads, “The Government of the Special Administrative Region shall provide an appro-
priate economic and legal environment for the maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as an inter-
national financial centre.” 
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Table 5 – The RMB deposit market in Hong Kong
RMB Deposits
(RMB billion)
Number of banks 
engaged in RMB 
business
January 2009 54.4 39
July 2009 55.9 41
June 2010 89.7 77
February 2011 407.7 113
Total number of banks is 143.
Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority.
leadership. (33) Since the political changeover, the Chinese mainland and
Hong Kong economies have become increasingly integrated due to policy
adaptations made by the HKSAR government, especially in its financial
sector under the auspices of its economic, monetary, and financial auton-
omy. (34) Given the closed and underdeveloped Chinese financial sector,
Hong Kong’s banks, stock, and bond markets have helped the economic
and financial development of the Chinese mainland, taking advantage of
their extensive business ties and geographical and cultural proximity. (35)
Moreover, through the operations of Chinese mainland banks, and the list-
ing of Chinese shares and bonds on the Hong Kong markets, expertise in
business practice, product development, and corporate governance can be
brought back to the mainland.
Hong Kong has been entrusted with a vital role in the development plan
of China’s Pearl River Delta region since 2009. The latest Five-Year Plan or
Blueprint on Economic and Social Development (2011-2015) of the central
government has also explicitly stated that Hong Kong is to become the off-
shore RMB centre and wealth management centre. This can be perceived as
another balancing act to ensure the future of Hong Kong, as Shanghai has
received the central government’s endorsement to become an international
financial and shipping centre by 2020. (36) However, when compared with
Hong Kong, Shanghai’s financial development has to be incremental and
gradual in order to serve China’s long-term and balanced interests.
Apart from political considerations, Hong Kong’s financial sector is better
equipped than Shanghai’s to launch RMB internationalisation. Hong Kong
has more expertise in financial product development, and its sophisticated
financial market infrastructure will better connect the mainland with the
rest of the world in financial investment. Hong Kong has a more competitive
international FX, banking, and money market than Shanghai, building on its
free capital flows and well-established legal and regulatory framework, and
a low and simple taxation system. In December 2010, whereas Hong Kong
had 122 foreign banks and 23 local banks offering both onshore and offshore
business, there were around 20 domestic commercial banks and 70 foreign
banks operating branches and subsidiaries undertaking onshore business in
Shanghai. Banks in Hong Kong can engage in insurance, securities, and trust
business directly, whereas their counterparts on the mainland must focus
only on commercial banking business. The money markets in Hong Kong are
also actively traded with the Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR),
providing a benchmark measure for the cost of interbank unsecured HKD
funds. (37) In China, despite the introduction of the Shanghai Interbank Of-
fered Rate (SHIBOR) in 2007, the interbank market for unsecured lending is
not active due to the trading limits of participant banks and restricted use of
funds. (38) Instead, the use of collateralised bond repurchase has become a
more active means of interbank borrowing in China. (39)
Hong Kong has been playing an important intermediary role in the eco-
nomic and financial development of China. Foreign and local firms from
Hong Kong were the earliest to trade and undertake investment in China
after the country’s reforms started in 1978. Over the past three decades,
Hong Kong has been making the largest foreign direct investment (FDI) in
the mainland, accounting for more than 50 percent of the total in 2009.
Benefiting from the international expansion of Chinese enterprises, Hong
Kong is now the largest recipient of overseas direct investment (ODI) flows
from the mainland, with 60 percent to Hong Kong or via Hong Kong to
other destinations. Furthermore, the mainland has been Hong Kong’s
largest trading partner since 1985, and accounted for 48.9 percent of Hong
Kong Kong’s total trade in 2010, broken down into around 53 percent each
of its total exports and re-exports to the mainland, and 45.4 percent of its
total imports from the mainland. As a result, Hong Kong has emerged as
the mainland’s third largest trading partner after the US and Japan. 
Prompted by these extensive direct investment and trade links, long-es-
tablished foreign and local banks in Hong Kong, such as HSBC, Standard
Chartered, Citibank, and the local banks HSBC and Bank of East Asia, fol-
lowed their customers and were early entrants to the Chinese banking
market. The mainland banks, led by BOCHK, a subsidiary of PBOC, and the
subsidiaries and branches of CCB, ICBC, and ABC, hold more than 20 per-
cent of the market share by assets in the Hong Kong banking market. The
unique position of the BOCHK, with its extensive branch network and as
one of the note-issuing banks, has led to it being assigned the role of clear-
ing and settlement bank for RMB businesses in Hong Kong and other parts
of the world.
Chinese companies have issued shares on the Hong Kong stock market
to raise funds since 1994. In December 2010, out of the 1,244 listed com-
panies on the Hong Kong stock market, 225 mainland companies issued
shares amounting to 46 percent of the total market capitalisation and
around 40 percent of the daily average turnover value in the secondary
market. Hong Kong also has the only RMB bond market outside the main-
land. Since 2007, RMB bonds have been issued by Chinese banks, followed
by foreign banks, the Ministry of Finance, and other multinational firms
such as McDonalds and Caterpillar. As of December 2010, there were 31
issues of Hong Kong-delivered Chinese Yuan (CNH) bonds in Hong Kong,
with a total gross issue value of RMB 73.8 billion. Strong international de-
mand has driven CNH bond yields far lower than onshore CNY bond yields
of the same maturity.
Hong Kong has a comprehensive and sophisticated multi-currency plat-
form for clearing and settlement of financial transactions. The Central
Moneymarkets Unit (CMU), the computerised clearing and settlement fa-
cilities for HKD and foreign currency bonds, operated by the HKMA, is now
linked with the Real Time Gross Settlement System in interbank payments
for HKD, USD, EUR, and CNY to ensure Payment versus Delivery of debt in-
struments denominated in the four currencies at the end of the transac-
tion day. More specifically, CMU has also been linked to China Government
Securities Depository Trust and Clearing Co. Ltd since April 2004, and
HKMA has been allowed to invest in the interbank market in China since
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33. See Anne-Laure Delatte and Maud Savary-Mornet, “Made In China, Financed in Hong Kong,” China Per-
spectives, no. 2, 2007. Before 2003, Jiang Zemin wanted to elevate the status of Shanghai, as Hong
Kong in the south was too rich and developed. The marked economic decline in Hong Kong brought
about by the SARS epidemic prompted the central government to come to Hong Kong’s aid with
schemes encouraging more individual traves to Hong Kong and the Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangements.
34. Ibid., pp. 58-67.
35. For banking integration, see Man Kwong Leung, “Banking Integration: Hong Kong and the People’s 
Republic of China,” China Report: A Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 33, no. 3, 2007, pp. 367-381. For
stock market integration, see Man Kwong Leung and Wai Sing Lee, “Stock Market Integration: Hong
Kong and the PRC,” Asian Profile, vol. 23, no. 4, 1997, pp. 267-279. For Bond market integration, see
Man Kwong Leung and Trevor Young, “Bond integration: The Chinese Mainland and Hong Kong,” Journal
of Contemporary China, vol. 15, no. 47, 2006, pp. 297-309.
36. China Daily, 26 March 2009.
37. In 2010, the ratio of interbank unsecured lending for banks in Hong Kong to GDP was 650 percent, and
that with banks outside Hong Kong was 640 percent. (Source: HKMA).
38. Leung and Lu, op.cit.
39. In 2010, the ratio of turnover value of bond repo to GDP was 220 percent, and that for unsecured lend-
ing to GDP was 70 percent in China. (Source: the PBOC Monetary Policy Implementation Report 
4th Quarterly 2010)
40. CMU was also connected to the Central Securities Depositories in Australia in 1997, New Zealand in
1998, and Korea in1999, to allow investment in each other’s debt markets.
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December 2010. (40) Figure 4 shows how Hong Kong’s financial infrastruc-
ture has enabled it to effect trade and payments in four currencies, and
against deliveries of debt, equity, and banking services across the border.
More specifically, Hong Kong has established the only RMB Real Time
Gross Settlement (RTGS) clearing platform outside the mainland. This
means that banks from outside Hong Kong (if they do not opt to go
through correspondent banks in Shanghai) must settle their RMB transac-
tions with correspondent banks (which have maintained RMB with the
BOCHK) in Hong Kong. This is both a first-mover and a unique advantage
of Hong Kong as an RMB offshore centre, arising from collaboration be-
tween the mainland and Hong Kong financial authorities.
The extensive business and financial ties and market infrastructure
links between the mainland and Hong Kong have provided the Chinese
government with the incentive and capability to monitor the process of
the RMB internationalisation, and have given Hong Kong the incentive
and opportunity to reinforce its role as an international financial centre
in the region.
Prospects for RMB internationalisation
Under the Mainland’s FX control, the onshore and offshore financial
markets are segregated. Hence, the interest rate and exchange rate in
the RMB offshore markets are determined by their respective market
conditions. On the mainland, PBOC Shenzhen Branch pays 0.72 per-
cent on the RMB deposits BOCHK collects, and pays 0.629 percent to
other banks. Bank customers then receive 0.6 percent on their RMB
one-year deposits in Hong Kong, whereas mainland depositors obtain
the benchmark rate of 3.25 percent. (41) The lower rates reflect the rel-
ative lack of RMB-denominated financial products for investment in
Hong Kong.
The offshore FX market for RMB also made a significant start in Hong
Kong in September 2010 when a newly tradable currency pair, USD/CNH
was launched globally. (42) By November 2010, the average daily FX
turnover for CNH had risen to USD 400 million, which was about 3 percent
of the total spot turnover value in the onshore market.
Sources of supply of CNH
CNH deposits can be accumulated in bank deposits through (a) Hong
Kong firms receiving RMB from selling goods and services to China, (b)
spending by mainland tourists in RMB in Hong Kong, and (c) the currency
swap between HKMA and PBOC. For the currency pair USD/CNH, the
sources of supply of CNH are equivalent to the sources of demand for USD.
Therefore, the higher the USD/CNH, the smaller the amount of USD will
be demanded from sources (a) to (c) as the USD becomes more expensive.
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41. PBOC Shenzhen branch lowered the interest rate from 0.99 percent to 0.72 percent on deposits from
BOCHK on 1 April 2011. Along with all other benchmark deposit and loan rates, the PBOC has raised
the one-year deposit rate on the mainland from 3 percent to 3.25 percent from 6 April 2011.
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Figure 4: – Hong Kong’s role in financial intermediation with the mainland
Note : CMU = Central Moneymarkets Unit / CDC = China Government Securities Depository Trust & Clearing Co. Ltd.
Source : Hong Kong Monetary Authority (2006).
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Sources of demand for CNH
Demand for CNH in bank deposits against USD come from (a) Hong
Kong firms buying goods in RMB from China, and (b) Hong Kong investors
purchasing CNH-denominated bonds and other CNH financial products.
For the currency pair USD/CNH, sources of demand for CNH are the same
as the supply of USD. The higher the USD/CNH, the greater the amount of
USD that will be supplied from these two sources.
Hong Kong residents can convert RMB into HKD, subject to a quota of
RMB 20,000 per day per person. (43) Other foreign firms outside Hong Kong
can pay and receive RMB through Hong Kong. For example, the increasing
acceptance of RMB as a trade settlement currency by importers in Europe
and North America has increased the demand for CNH in Hong Kong. All
these transactions need to be cleared in Hong Kong. (44) To avoid excess FX
risk, HKMA has also required banks in Hong Kong to limit their RMB net
open positions (whether net long or net short) to 10 percent of their RMB
assets or liabilities. 
In Figure 5, the prevailing market rate for USD/CNH is illustrated by the
intersection of D0 and SI at N. Assuming the same demand D0 on both on-
shore and offshore markets, SI, the supply of international capital, is
greater than the restricted supply SD in the onshore market. It follows that
the USD/CNH is trading at a discount, x, to the USD/CNY in Shanghai. For
example, on 20 Jan 2011, USD/CNY was 6.5860, and USD/CNH was
6.5805, such that x was 55 pips and the RMB carried a premium of 0.08
percent in the offshore compared to the onshore market. When the pre-
mium of CNH increases, more mainland parent firms will arrange to pay
their foreign suppliers in USD through their Hong Kong subsidiaries, which
could convert CNH received from parents for more USD. This can be illus-
trated by a shift in demand to D1, thus reducing the premium of CNH over
CNY.
Figure 4 provides the framework within which we may examine the fac-
tors facilitating the process of the RMB internationalisation, using Hong
Kong as an RMB offshore centre.
Sustained growth of the Chinese economy
China’s GDP increased from USD 200 billion in 1978 to USD 5.8 trillion, reg-
istering an annual real growth rate of 10 percent from 1978 to 2010. This has
been sufficient to allow China to overtake Japan as the second largest econ-
omy in the world. According to the IMF projections, China will contribute 35
percent to the world’s growth in 2015. The sustained strong growth of the
Chinese economy will instil more confidence in international traders and in-
vestors for holding RMB. This will provide the underlying economic force shift-
ing the supply curve of USD for CNH in the offshore market.
Supply of RMB in the offshore market
In December 2010, HKMA and PBOC collaborated to establish two chan-
nels to ensure a stable supply of RMB for cross-border trade settlement.
First, banks in Hong Kong can purchase RMB for their customers through
the BOCHK in CFETS in Shanghai when there is a shortfall of RMB for set-
tling a trade transaction within three months. The quota for this conver-
sion between the PBOC and BOCHK was RMB 8 billion in 2010. The quota
was set at RMB 4 billion for the first and second quarter of 2011. Second,
the HKMA could provide RMB funds up to 20 billion through its currency
swap arrangement with the PBOC for cross-border RMB trade settle-
ments. (45)
As an additional source of supply of RMB, from January 2011, the Chinese
government has allowed Chinese firms to make their overseas direct invest-
ment (ODI) in RMB. (46) Non-financial Chinese enterprises can make ODI in
RMB, subject to the approval of the Ministry of Commerce. At present, 80
percent of China’s ODI are from the state-owned enterprises and in USD. If
China’s ODI can be financed in RMB, more RMB will be expected to return
to Hong Kong, investing in a growing range of RMB financial assets. At pres-
ent, outward portfolio investment (OPI) from the mainland is only around
5 percent of its GDP, still far below 57 percent for East Asia, 42 percent for
the US, and over 100 percent for the UK. There exists a large potential for
the mainland’s OPI to grow faster with a rise in income per capita and fur-
ther liberalisation measures. The increases in the supply of CNH will trans-
late into increased demand for USD, as indicated in Figure 5.
Returning RMB to mainland investments
The increases in both demand and supply over time mean that the
turnover values in the Hong Kong offshore market can grow dynamically.
Through the conversion quotas and approved channels for flows of RMB
between Shanghai and Hong Kong, PBOC could also have an effective con-
trol over the exchange rate for USD/CNH.
Despite the growing RMB bond market and other RMB financial products
in Hong Kong, their sizes are still small. From August 2010, RMB clearing
banks, central banks, and commercial banks participating in RMB business
have been allowed by the PBOC to invest their RMB in China’s large inter-
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42. The currency pair USD/CNH was launched and listed by ICAP, an international interdealer broker, on its
EBS platform. All CNH trades will be settled in Hong Kong, using the RMB Real Time Gross Settlement.
43. The daily conversion quota is two-way, but Hong Kong residents have increasingly built up their RMB
deposits through selling foreign currencies.
44. See Hong Kong Economic Times, 25 January 2011. 
45. Since 2008, the PBOC has signed bilateral currency swap agreements for RMB with central banks in
Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Belarus, Argentina, and Iceland, totalling RMB
803.5 billion. This provides liquidity needed to settle trade with these eight economies in RMB.
46. Financial firms such as securities firms have already done this on a case by case basis with approval
from SAFE.
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Figure 5 – FX market for RMB in Hong Kong
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bank bond market. In December 2010, 12 banks from Hong Kong received
this permission. Banks in Hong Kong could capture a higher rate of return
on CNY bonds than on CNH bond investments. These banks can in turn
offer higher interest rates to attract more CNH deposits so that more peo-
ple are willing to convert their foreign currencies to CNH in Hong Kong. (47)
Balanced development of the onshore and offshore
financial markets
Taking advantage of a large pool of RMB liquidity and opportunities to
launch RMB financial products, Hong Kong helps to attract increasing
flows of RMB funds from other parts of the world. More specifically, Hong
Kong can focus on wealth and risk management of RMB products.
CNY Non-Deliverable Forward (NDF) has now been actively traded in
Hong Kong as a hedging tool for RMB exchange risks. (48) The contracts are
to be settled in USD and involve no delivery of RMB. Now with the oper-
ations of the RMB offshore markets, major international banks such as
HSBC can also offer CNH-denominated structured investment products,
including CNH Deliverable Forward such that RMB can be delivered in
Hong Kong.
The growth of the offshore markets will provide benchmarking for pric-
ing and regulations in the Shanghai onshore markets. Shanghai acknowl-
edges the need for implementing reforms to its financial markets and in-
stitutions aimed at increasing their efficiency and international compet-
itiveness. Through the flow of RMB funds between Shanghai and Hong
Kong, the two markets are likely to benefit from an increase in their
competitive and adaptive efficiency, particularly in the areas of RMB fi-
nancial products and their risk management. This will make the mainland
better prepared for full RMB convertibility. It has been argued that there
should be restrictions on the RMB raised in Hong Kong coming back to
the mainland. The onshore market in Shanghai should be fully and well
developed ahead of Hong Kong so that China can maintain robust con-
trol over the RMB interest rate and exchange rate. China therefore needs
to strike a good balance in the development of offshore and onshore
markets.
Conclusion
China has emphasised the need for a controlled, gradualist approach to
capital account full convertibility and a flexible exchange rate. This has
provided the underlying motivation for RMB internationalisation. However,
the 2008 global financial crisis has prompted China to quicken the pace of
RMB internationalisation so that the currency has been made more widely
convertible outside the mainland, with Hong Kong in a unique position to
emerge as an RMB offshore centre. Nevertheless, China has only reached
the preliminary stage of RMB internationalisation. The country has made
good progress in promoting RMB as a cross-border trade settlement cur-
rency, but Hong Kong is still far from functioning in the same way for off-
shore RMB as London does for the Eurodollar market. Hong Kong needs to
collaborate closely to ensure that internationalisation of the RMB is a
gradual and well-controlled process.
To make RMB an investment currency, Hong Kong markets need to
provide a wide range of RMB wealth and management products, while
the mainland needs liberalisation of the exchange rate and interest rate
in the onshore financial markets, together with balanced development
of the onshore and offshore financial markets. This will pave the way for
the full convertibility of the currency on the mainland, which is a nec-
essary condition for full RMB internationalisation. With well-developed
and large money and capital markets on the mainland and the continu-
ing strong growth of the Chinese economy, it is expected that more in-
ternational enterprises and national governments will be willing to in-
vest in RMB-denominated assets as an essential part of their portfolios
and reserves.
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47. The Chinese government is looking into the possibility of allowing RMB holders overseas to purchase
shares on the mainland stock market under the Mini-QFII scheme.
48. In response to a managed float for RMB, the trading for nominal value RMB Non-Deliverable Forward
for corporate clients in offshore markets was estimated to have registered a rapid increase from around
USD 250 billion in 2005 to USD 350 billion in 2007. In fact, standardised RMB NDF contracts were
also formally launched for retail clients by 16 banks in Hong Kong from November 2005.
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